

S 2508

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

March 12, 1984

ing an amendment relating to the balancing of the Federal budget.

SENATE JOINT RESOLUTION 252

At the request of Mrs. HAWKINS, the name of the Senator from Alabama (Mr. HEFLIN) was added as a cosponsor of Senate Joint Resolution 252, a joint resolution to designate May 25, 1984, as "Missing Children Day."

SENATE JOINT RESOLUTION 256

At the request of Mr. THURMOND, the name of the Senator from California (Mr. CRANSTON) was added as a cosponsor of Senate Joint Resolution 256, a joint resolution designating March 21, 1984, as "National Single Parent Day."

SENATE RESOLUTION 74

At the request of Mr. PELL, the name of the Senator from Hawaii (Mr. INOUE) was added as a cosponsor of Senate Resolution 74, a resolution expressing the sense of the Senate concerning the future of the people on Taiwan.

SENATE CONCURRENT RESOLUTION 97—GOALS AND CONDITIONS ON AID TO CENTRAL AMERICA

Mr. DURENBERGER (for himself, Mr. INOUE, and Mrs. KASSEBAUM) submitted the following concurrent resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations:

S. CON. RES. 97

Whereas the Central American Democracy, Peace and Development Initiative Act of 1984 recognizes the need for a "consistent and coherent policy which includes a long-term commitment of both economic and military assistance";

Whereas the Act specifies that this policy should be designed "to support actively democracy, political reform and human rights; to promote equitable economic growth and development; to foster dialogue and negotiations to achieve peace based upon the objectives of democratization, reduction of armament, and end to subversion and the withdrawal of foreign forces and advisors; and to provide a security shield against violence and intimidation"; and

Whereas both Congress and the National Bipartisan Commission on Central America have recognized that our assistance must be made conditional on acceptable progress toward these goals in order to foster stability and reduce the potential for subversion: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives concurring), That it is the sense of the Congress that the President should not furnish assistance authorized by the Central America Democracy, Peace and Development Initiative Act to any Central American country unless the furnishing of such assistance is specifically authorized by law.

SEC. 2. (a) For purposes of section 1, the phrase "specifically authorized by law" means an authorization contained in a joint resolution which—

(1) approves the obligation or expenditure of a certain amount of funds during the remainder of fiscal year 1984 or any six-month period thereafter;

(2) was considered in the House of Representatives and the Senate in accordance with subsection (b); and

(3) was enacted into law.

(b) The consideration of a joint resolution referred to in subsection (a) is a joint resolution

accorded congressional priority procedures under section 601(b) of the International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976 and which, when reported from committee or within 24 hours of being discharged from committee, is accompanied by a report from the appropriate committee which outlines past and anticipated progress in each of the recipient countries toward the goals set forth in title I of the Central America, Democracy Peace and Development Initiative Act, including—

(1) the particular plans developed by each recipient government in order to implement such goals;

(2) the committee's assessment of the likelihood that such goals can be accomplished and of extra-national factors that may constrain achievement of such goals;

(3) the plans of the United States Government, and the views of the executive branch, clearly identified as such, with respect to the long-range furnishing of assistance to each recipient country; and

(4) progress toward such goals as the committee may feel appropriate and progress toward—

(A) the establishment of unconditional discussions among various parties in dispute throughout Central America;

(B) the observance of free and regular elections;

(C) the curtailment of press censorship and other intrusions on the rights of free speech and assembly;

(D) the curtailment of hostile acts against neighboring countries;

(E) the establishment of an independent and functional judicial system;

(F) the curtailment of acts of violence and other abuses of human rights against citizens of the recipient countries; and

(G) the curtailment of capital flight, the implementation of agricultural reform, the curtailment of diversion of assistance funds, and other measures of economic stabilization.

SEC. 3. The Secretary of the Senate shall transmit a copy of this concurrent resolution to the President.

Mr. DURENBERGER. Mr. President, once again, Central America is at the top of our agenda. Once again, we face the same complex, challenging, and urgent set of questions with which we have been dealing, on and off, for the past few years.

We will take up this recurring question in the context of a dizzying array of events over the past few months. Since we last debated this issue, we have seen the filing of the report of the National Bipartisan Commission on Central America. We have seen massive military exercises undertaken in Honduras. We have seen detailed press accounts of operations which we still call covert. We have seen the continuing and sickening litany of atrocities which constitute daily political fare in El Salvador. We have seen the Marxist government of Nicaragua continue its consolidation, sharpen its rhetoric, and improve its methods of repression and subversion. And, most recently, we have seen the administration fail in its attempt to bypass congressional debate over additional funding.

Perhaps most importantly, Mr. President, we have seen over the past few years the failure of the certification process which we had hoped

would both put teeth into the linkage between aid and performance and would as well permit Congress to be informed about events.

I am today submitting, along with Senators INOUE and KASSEBAUM, a concurrent resolution which is designed to get our policy off the dime.

The essence of our resolution is to require that, every 6 months, Congress take up the issue of our policy toward the entire region of Central America, and either approve or alter the funding requests contained in the Central America Democracy, Peace and Development Initiative Act of 1984.

It is our presumption that far too little is really known about the complexity of events in Central America, and that Congress has for too long simply been abrogating its responsibility to understand, oversee, and help shape our policy. The certification process on which we relied for so long was little more than an invitation to the President to check off some boxes every few months while the money went forward. We want to cure that.

Ours is neither a proadministration nor an antiadministration resolution. It is designed to bolster and support those policies which merit such support, and to alter or cut short those policies which fail. It is designed to let individual Members of Congress draw their own conclusions about our policy in Central America after a fair and full hearing. As one who has a long-standing familiarity with Central America, and as one who has generally been supportive of the overall policy aims of the administration, I feel confident that this resolution can do nothing except strengthen our efforts in Central America and provide the margin of confidence which will be needed if we are to implement the Central American Initiative.

The Kissinger Commission made abundantly clear that time is at a premium in Central America, a region caught in a race between repression and reform. We cannot afford business as usual. We need a policy, and we need some hope of success. Thus far, that policy has been unclear to many of us and the hope of success has dimmed as events have appeared to be moving toward stalemate.

As the Commission made abundantly clear, our only hope of success lies in fostering consistent, significant, and regular reform. If we fail in this, or if our efforts backfire regardless of how well intended, we have no hope of preventing both a period of major violence and an opportunity for the Soviets and Cubans to make our failure their gain.

This, of course, is why so many Senators have been concerned about conditioning our assistance on some tangible signs of progress, particularly with respect to human rights. Conditional policy is a sensible approach to our overall policy, a point made as clear by the Vice President in his courageous re-

Executive Registry

125738

March 12, 1984

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

S 2509

marks in San Salvador as by the Kissinger Commission itself.

But in the past, we have let our concern over conditionality become a debate over the device certification. In other words, we have confused a goal with an instrument. Moreover, I feel that we have allowed a complex set of issues involving many countries to become defined as a comparatively simple issue involving only one. By trying to define human rights in terms of specific criteria—and the list of criteria seems to grow longer every day—we lose sight of the larger issue. And by confining our attention only to El Salvador, we lose sight of the fact that El Salvador commands our attention primarily because it is one nation among several in a critical region. So in numerous respects, our attempts at implementing conditionality have been artificially narrow.

But there is a more serious problem with the certification approach. Simply put, this approach has been an invitation for Congress to step away from its responsibilities. As the device was crafted, it called for the filing of a set of "findings" on a regular basis by the President. Once those findings were filed, regardless of their content, money flowed more or less automatically. All that was involved was a Presidential "check-off" in the right boxes. Congress played virtually no role, except to comment without effect.

I strongly believe that the day-to-day direction of our foreign policy must be set by the executive branch through the President. We are often reminded that we cannot afford to have 535 extra Secretaries of State, and that is good advice.

But we cannot take this sensible advice to the extreme of saying that Congress has no role to play in foreign policy or that only the appointees in the executive branch have the requisite information and expertise. We have learned too hard and too well the hazards of that kind of deference.

Our foreign policy relies on the support of the public for its success. It was in recognition of this core reality that the Constitution vested oversight and funding authority in the Congress. And if the Congress chooses to abrogate its responsibilities—as it has done—our policy suffers.

If our policy is to succeed, it requires that the American people, and the Congress, draw informed conclusions from a thorough study of the issue. To do so requires debate. And debate is an active enterprise, not a passive reaction to the findings of others. We must each draw our own inferences from as wide an array of information as possible if we are to help foster and support the kind of long-range policy called for by the Kissinger Commission. We simply cannot afford to let others draw those inferences and conclusions for us, and we certainly cannot afford to view this complex but crucial issue through a narrow prism.

We have got to begin the difficult task of developing a regional viewpoint. Nobody else can do that for us. We must do it ourselves.

In other words, I am concerned that we have failed in more than the constitutional responsibilities which might strike some as either abstruse or debatable. My concern is not simply academic. We have failed in our duty to help create and support policy as well. The losers will be both the people of this country and the people of Central America.

But having said this, let me add that we are not alone in the failure of this country to develop a regional policy which is more than simply the aggregation of several bilateral policies. We are not alone in the failure to make our policy clear to the people who must ultimately support it. We are not alone in the failure to provide to our policy the sense of vision and long-range plans called for by the National Bipartisan Commission.

There is plenty of blame to go around, and the administration cannot escape its share. I must question just how seriously the administration takes the call for a long-range policy of reform when it has yet to inundate the Congress with its lobbyists, as it did when it wanted to see adoption of the Sowers Commission recommendations. I must question whether the administration seeks a bipartisan policy, as called for by the Commission, when it resorts to the kind of ill-fated end runs which it attempted last week to its own chagrin and the chagrin of those who support it. I must question whether the administration understands just how much peril its plans face in this Congress.

So there is no gainsaying the fact that our policy in Central America faces a crucial test over the next few months. The test is two-fold. First, Congress has got to quit ducking the issue, relying on somebody else to do its job for it while it seeks the short-range benefits of criticism and headlines without the offsetting burden of responsibility. We can no longer just play to the gallery on this one. Second, the administration has simply got to come to grips with the fact that, like it or not, its policy is in serious trouble and it will succeed only to the extent that it begins to treat Congress as a partner rather than an irrelevant and noisome collection of amateurs. The sad fact is that, in Central America, we are all amateurs, for our policy toward this region has for nearly two centuries been one of neglect punctuated by periods of panic.

Very simply, our resolution would require that Congress, on a semi-annual basis, take up the entire issue of our regional policy and its progress. Every six months, Congress would be provided by the appropriate committees with a comprehensive report covering everything from the plans of nations which receive our aid to an assessment of those plans. While the res-

olution does specify some indicators which should be covered in the semi-annual report, it does not seek to limit the contents. In other words, we are asking the Foreign Relations Committee, in consultation with such other authorities as it might deem fit, to provide a regular and comprehensive look at exactly what is going on in Central America.

But our resolution does not stop with a report. It requires that after Congress has been provided with its semi-annual reports, it proceed to a debate on further funding for each of the recipient countries. This debate will culminate in a vote on a joint resolution authorizing expenditures for the next six months.

In other words, under the terms of our resolution, Congress will be compelled—for the first time—to debate Central America on a regular, consistent, and comprehensive basis. Members will no longer have the luxury of comment without effects or headlines without responsibility. Discussion will focus on more than one issue or one country. And the administration will no longer have the free ride which it has been getting because Congress has been unwilling or unable to meet its own responsibilities.

So, on balance, Mr. President, there is something in this bill for everybody. For Congress, there is the opportunity to take a regional look at a regional policy, and to do something about it. For the administration, there is the opportunity to see the issues debated in all their complexity, rather than constrained to whatever happens to be the latest headlines. And for the people of Central America, there is the opportunity to see the U.S. political system begin to treat this issue with the seriousness it deserves.

SENATE CONCURRENT RESOLUTION 98—COMMENDING THE STATUE OF LIBERTY—ELLIS ISLAND CENTENNIAL COMMISSION

Mr. QUAYLE (for himself, Mr. BRADLEY, Mr. D'AMATO, Mr. MOYNIHAN, and Mr. LAUTENBERG) submitted the following concurrent resolution; which was referred to the Committee on the Judiciary:

S. CON. RES. 98

Whereas the Statue of Liberty is a symbol of freedom, hope, and opportunity around the world;

Whereas the Statue of Liberty welcomed millions of immigrants to a new land and a new home;

Whereas the Statue of Liberty, a gift from France, is a monument to the friendship between the peoples of France and the United States of America;

Whereas the Statue of Liberty has been ravaged by time and the elements and is in a serious state of disrepair;

Whereas the President has appointed a twenty-member commission to raise funds for the restoration and preservation of the Statue of Liberty and Ellis Island and to plan centennial celebration events for 1986;

Executive Registry

35,739

Foreign Policy - 3



Salvadorans line up to receive food donated by the United States. Upcoming elections in that country have complicated U.S. efforts to provide more aid.

Stephen J. Solarz, D-N.Y., said he feared the entire foreign aid bill would be held "hostage" to the Central America provisions. On his motion, the committee voted to delete the Central America aid proposals from the bill.

Chairman Dante B. Fascell, D-Fla., said the committee would take up the Central America aid issue as soon as possible. But other members said that was not likely before the Salvadoran elections.

Finding a silver lining in the committee action, administration officials said they were pleased that the panel had allowed more time for negotiations on the issue. The administration had expected Foreign Affairs, with its heavy majority of liberal Democrats, to pose the biggest hurdle in Congress to Reagan's aid proposals.

James H. Michel, deputy assistant secretary of state for inter-American affairs, said the severing of Central America from the aid bill "simply defers" the committee's decisions.

The Democratic proposal that the administration sought to avoid represented a compromise.

Fascell and a handful of his colleagues have tended to support Reagan on Central America and have opposed major changes in his aid requests. But a clear majority of committee Democrats oppose Reagan's policies, especially in El Salvador, and want to impose tough conditions on any aid provided to that country.

Although the majority view prevailed, Fascell managed to tone down

some of the provisions that the administration most disliked. The major provisions in the draft proposal would:

- Reject Reagan's original request for authorization of \$178.7 million in additional military aid to El Salvador in fiscal 1984. Reagan's March 7 informal request to the Senate Appropriations Committee for \$92.75 million was to be part of the \$178.7 million.

- Give Reagan a free hand in fiscal 1985 to spend \$64.8 million in military aid and half of his \$210 million economic aid request. Reagan could get another \$124.5 million in military and economic aid in 1985 if both chambers of Congress passed a joint resolution approving a presidential report stating that the Salvadoran government "has achieved" a series of human rights and other objectives. In effect, that provision would create a one-house legislative veto, since either chamber could block additional aid by refusing to pass the joint resolution. As originally proposed by the Western Hemisphere Affairs Subcommittee, all fiscal 1985 Salvadoran aid would have been subject to these conditions.

- Set a limit of 55 U.S. military advisers in El Salvador at any one time and ban the president from using his emergency powers to bypass Congress on military aid to that country. (*Emergency powers*, p. 611)

- Ban further U.S. military maneuvers in Honduras and prohibit any such maneuvers in Guatemala.

- Dump the Kissinger commission recommendations for a five-year, \$8 billion-plus plan of economic and

development aid to Central America. Instead, the Democrats proposed a fund for the "reconstruction and development of Central America," with \$250 million authorized for fiscal 1984. The money could be spent only if the president reported to Congress that all countries in the region had entered into a "comprehensive peace agreement." Costa Rica and Honduras had objected that the provision would give leftist Nicaragua a veto over aid to other countries.

New Senate Proposal

Another approach to the Salvadoran issue has been advocated by Sens. Daniel K. Inouye, D-Hawaii; Dave Durenberger, R-Minn.; and Nancy Landon Kassebaum, R-Kan.

The three senators on March 12 introduced a resolution (S Con Res 97) that would establish a new process for Congress to review the situation in Central America every six months before allowing aid to be released.

Durenberger said it was "neither a pro-administration nor an anti-administration resolution." But administration officials made it clear they would oppose any legislation that would have the effect of giving Congress a veto over Central American aid. When Kassebaum suggested such an approach on Feb. 23, Secretary of State George P. Shultz responded that it gave him "mind burn."

Under the resolution, the Senate Foreign Relations and House Foreign Affairs Committees would each report twice annually on progress of Central American governments on such goals as holding free elections, conducting "unconditional discussions" to end regional wars and curtailing human rights abuses.

Based on those reports, Congress would act on a joint resolution authorizing aid for Central America — much as it currently is charged with passing annual bills authorizing all foreign aid.

S Con Res 97 would not be binding; it merely expresses the sense of Congress that the president should not provide aid to Central America unless Congress had approved it by passing a joint resolution.

Durenberger said the administration "has simply got to come to grips with the fact that, like it or not, its policy is in serious trouble and it will succeed only to the extent that it begins to treat Congress as a partner rather than an irrelevant and noisome collection of amateurs."

S 2508

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

March 12, 1984

ing an amendment relating to the balancing of the Federal budget.

SENATE JOINT RESOLUTION 252

At the request of Mrs. HAWKINS, the name of the Senator from Alabama (Mr. HEFLIN) was added as a cosponsor of Senate Joint Resolution 252, a joint resolution to designate May 25, 1984, as "Missing Children Day."

SENATE JOINT RESOLUTION 256

At the request of Mr. THURMOND, the name of the Senator from California (Mr. CRANSTON) was added as a cosponsor of Senate Joint Resolution 256, a joint resolution designating March 21, 1984, as "National Single Parent Day."

SENATE RESOLUTION 74

At the request of Mr. PELL, the name of the Senator from Hawaii (Mr. INOUE) was added as a cosponsor of Senate Resolution 74, a resolution expressing the sense of the Senate concerning the future of the people on Taiwan.

SENATE CONCURRENT RESOLUTION 97—GOALS AND CONDITIONS ON AID TO CENTRAL AMERICA

Mr. DURENBERGER (for himself, Mr. INOUE, and Mrs. KASSEBAUM) submitted the following concurrent resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations:

S. CON. RES. 97

Whereas the Central American Democracy, Peace and Development Initiative Act of 1984 recognizes the need for a "consistent and coherent policy which includes a long-term commitment of both economic and military assistance";

Whereas the Act specifies that this policy should be designed "to support actively democracy, political reform and human rights; to promote equitable economic growth and development; to foster dialogue and negotiations to achieve peace based upon the objectives of democratization, reduction of armament, and end to subversion and the withdrawal of foreign forces and advisors; and to provide a security shield against violence and intimidation"; and

Whereas both Congress and the National Bipartisan Commission on Central America have recognized that our assistance must be made conditional on acceptable progress toward these goals in order to foster stability and reduce the potential for subversion: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives concurring), That it is the sense of the Congress that the President should not furnish assistance authorized by the Central America Democracy, Peace and Development Initiative Act to any Central American country unless the furnishing of such assistance is specifically authorized by law.

SEC. 2. (a) For purposes of section 1, the phrase "specifically authorized by law" means an authorization contained in a joint resolution which—

(1) approves the obligation or expenditure of a certain amount of funds during the remainder of fiscal year 1984 or any six-month period thereafter;

(2) was considered in the House of Representatives and the Senate in accordance with subsection (b); and

(3) was enacted into law.

(b) The consideration of a joint resolution referred to in subsection (a) is a joint resolu-

tion accorded congressional priority procedures under section 601(b) of the International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976 and which, when reported from committee or within 24 hours of being discharged from committee, is accompanied by a report from the appropriate committee which outlines past and anticipated progress in each of the recipient countries toward the goals set forth in title I of the Central America, Democracy Peace and Development Initiative Act, including—

(1) the particular plans developed by each recipient government in order to implement such goals;

(2) the committee's assessment of the likelihood that such goals can be accomplished and of extra-national factors that may constrain achievement of such goals;

(3) the plans of the United States Government, and the views of the executive branch, clearly identified as such, with respect to the long-range furnishing of assistance to each recipient country; and

(4) progress toward such goals as the committee may feel appropriate and progress toward—

(A) the establishment of unconditional discussions among various parties in dispute throughout Central America;

(B) the observance of free and regular elections;

(C) the curtailment of press censorship and other intrusions on the rights of free speech and assembly;

(D) the curtailment of hostile acts against neighboring countries;

(E) the establishment of an independent and functional judicial system;

(F) the curtailment of acts of violence and other abuses of human rights against citizens of the recipient countries; and

(G) the curtailment of capital flight, the implementation of agricultural reform, the curtailment of diversion of assistance funds, and other measures of economic stabilization.

SEC. 3. The Secretary of the Senate shall transmit a copy of this concurrent resolution to the President.

Mr. DURENBERGER. Mr. President, once again, Central America is at the top of our agenda. Once again, we face the same complex, challenging, and urgent set of questions with which we have been dealing, on and off, for the past few years.

We will take up this recurring question in the context of a dizzying array of events over the past few months. Since we last debated this issue, we have seen the filing of the report of the National Bipartisan Commission on Central America. We have seen massive military exercises undertaken in Honduras. We have seen detailed press accounts of operations which we still call covert. We have seen the continuing and sickening litany of atrocities which constitute daily political fare in El Salvador. We have seen the Marxist government of Nicaragua continue its consolidation, sharpen its rhetoric, and improve its methods of repression and subversion. And, most recently, we have seen the administration fail in its attempt to bypass congressional debate over additional funding.

Perhaps most importantly, Mr. President, we have seen over the past few years the failure of the certification process which we had hoped

would both put teeth into the linkage between aid and performance and would as well permit Congress to be informed about events.

I am today submitting, along with Senators INOUE and KASSEBAUM, a concurrent resolution which is designed to get our policy off the dime.

The essence of our resolution is to require that, every 6 months, Congress take up the issue of our policy toward the entire region of Central America, and either approve or alter the funding requests contained in the Central America Democracy, Peace and Development Initiative Act of 1984.

It is our presumption that far too little is really known about the complexity of events in Central America, and that Congress has for too long simply been abrogating its responsibility to understand, oversee, and help shape our policy. The certification process on which we relied for so long was little more than an invitation to the President to check off some boxes every few months while the money went forward. We want to cure that.

Ours is neither a proadministration nor an antiadministration resolution. It is designed to bolster and support those policies which merit such support, and to alter or cut short those policies which fail. It is designed to let individual Members of Congress draw their own conclusions about our policy in Central America after a fair and full hearing. As one who has a long-standing familiarity with Central America, and as one who has generally been supportive of the overall policy aims of the administration, I feel confident that this resolution can do nothing except strengthen our efforts in Central America and provide the margin of confidence which will be needed if we are to implement the Central American Initiative.

The Kissinger Commission made abundantly clear that time is at a premium in Central America, a region caught in a race between repression and reform. We cannot afford business as usual. We need a policy, and we need some hope of success. Thus far, that policy has been unclear to many of us and the hope of success has dimmed as events have appeared to be moving toward stalemate.

As the Commission made abundantly clear, our only hope of success lies in fostering consistent, significant, and regular reform. If we fail in this, or if our efforts backfire regardless of how well intended, we have no hope of preventing both a period of major violence and an opportunity for the Soviets and Cubans to make our failure their gain.

This, of course, is why so many Senators have been concerned about conditioning our assistance on some tangible signs of progress, particularly with respect to human rights. Conditionality is a sensible approach to our overall policy, a point made as clear by the Vice President in his courageous re-

35,741

March 12, 1984

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

S 2509

marks in San Salvador as by the Kissinger Commission itself.

But in the past, we have let our concern over conditionality become a debate over the device certification. In other words, we have confused a goal with an instrument. Moreover, I feel that we have allowed a complex set of issues involving many countries to become defined as a comparatively simple issue involving only one. By trying to define human rights in terms of specific criteria—and the list of criteria seems to grow longer every day—we lose sight of the larger issue. And by confining our attention only to El Salvador, we lose sight of the fact that El Salvador commands our attention primarily because it is one nation among several in a critical region. So in numerous respects, our attempts at implementing conditionality have been artificially narrow.

But there is a more serious problem with the certification approach. Simply put, this approach has been an invitation for Congress to step away from its responsibilities. As the device was crafted, it called for the filing of a set of "findings" on a regular basis by the President. Once those findings were filed, regardless of their content, money flowed more or less automatically. All that was involved was a Presidential "check-off" in the right boxes. Congress played virtually no role, except to comment without effect.

I strongly believe that the day-to-day direction of our foreign policy must be set by the executive branch through the President. We are often reminded that we cannot afford to have 535 extra Secretaries of State, and that is good advice.

But we cannot take this sensible advice to the extreme of saying that Congress has no role to play in foreign policy or that only the appointees in the executive branch have the requisite information and expertise. We have learned too hard and too well the hazards of that kind of deference.

Our foreign policy relies on the support of the public for its success. It was in recognition of this core reality that the Constitution vested oversight and funding authority in the Congress. And if the Congress chooses to abrogate its responsibilities—as it has done—our policy suffers.

If our policy is to succeed, it requires that the American people, and the Congress, draw informed conclusions from a thorough study of the issue. To do so requires debate. And debate is an active enterprise, not a passive reaction to the findings of others. We must each draw our own inferences from as wide an array of information as possible if we are to help foster and support the kind of long-range policy called for by the Kissinger Commission. We simply cannot afford to let others draw those inferences and conclusions for us, and we certainly cannot afford to view this complex but crucial issue through a narrow prism.

We have got to begin the difficult task of developing a regional viewpoint. Nobody else can do that for us. We must do it ourselves.

In other words, I am concerned that we have failed in more than the constitutional responsibilities which might strike some as either abstruse or debatable. My concern is not simply academic. We have failed in our duty to help create and support policy as well. The losers will be both the people of this country and the people of Central America.

But having said this, let me add that we are not alone in the failure of this country to develop a regional policy which is more than simply the aggregation of several bilateral policies. We are not alone in the failure to make our policy clear to the people who must ultimately support it. We are not alone in the failure to provide to our policy the sense of vision and long-range plans called for by the National Bipartisan Commission.

There is plenty of blame to go around, and the administration cannot escape its share. I must question just how seriously the administration takes the call for a long-range policy of reform when it has yet to inundate the Congress with its lobbyists, as it did when it wanted to see adoption of the Scofield Commission recommendations. I must question whether the administration seeks a bipartisan policy, as called for by the Commission, when it resorts to the kind of inflated end runs which it attempted last week to its own chagrin and the chagrin of those who support it. I must question whether the administration understands just how much peril its plans face in this Congress.

So there is no gainsaying the fact that our policy in Central America faces a crucial test over the next few months. The test is two-fold. First, Congress has got to quit docking the issue, relying on somebody else to do its job for it while it seeks the short-range benefits of criticism and headlines without the offsetting burden of responsibility. We can no longer just play to the gallery on this one. Second, the administration has simply got to come to grips with the fact that, like it or not, its policy is in serious trouble and it will succeed only to the extent that it begins to treat Congress as a partner rather than an irrelevant and noisome collection of amateurs. The sad fact is that, in Central America, we are all amateurs, for our policy toward this region has for nearly two centuries been one of neglect punctuated by periods of panic.

Very simply, our resolution would require that Congress, on a semi-annual basis, take up the entire issue of our regional policy and its progress. Every six months, Congress would be provided by the appropriate committees with a comprehensive report covering everything from the plans of nations which receive our aid to an assessment of those plans. While the res-

olution does specify some indicators which should be covered in the semi-annual report, it does not seek to limit the contents. In other words, we are asking the Foreign Relations Committee, in consultation with such other authorities as it might deem fit, to provide a regular and comprehensive look at exactly what is going on in Central America.

But our resolution does not stop with a report. It requires that after Congress has been provided with its semi-annual reports, it proceed to a debate on further funding for each of the recipient countries. This debate will culminate in a vote on a joint resolution authorizing expenditures for the next six months.

In other words, under the terms of our resolution, Congress will be compelled—for the first time—to debate Central America on a regular, consistent, and comprehensive basis. Members will no longer have the luxury of comment without effects or headlines without responsibility. Discussion will focus on more than one issue or one country. And the administration will no longer have the free ride which it has been getting because Congress has been unwilling or unable to meet its own responsibilities.

So, on balance, Mr. President, there is something in this bill for everybody. For Congress, there is the opportunity to take a regional look at a regional policy, and to do something about it. For the administration, there is the opportunity to see the issues debated in all their complexity, rather than constrained to whatever happens to be the latest headlines. And for the people of Central America, there is the opportunity to see the U.S. political system begin to treat this issue with the seriousness it deserves.

SENATE CONCURRENT RESOLUTION 98—COMMENDING THE STATUE OF LIBERTY—ELLIS ISLAND CENTENNIAL COMMISSION

Mr. QUAYLE (for himself, Mr. BRADLEY, Mr. D'AMATO, Mr. MOYNIHAN, and Mr. LAUTENBERG) submitted the following concurrent resolution: which was referred to the Committee on the Judiciary:

S. CON. RES. 98

Whereas the Statue of Liberty is a symbol of freedom, hope, and opportunity around the world;

Whereas the Statue of Liberty welcomed millions of immigrants to a new land and a new home;

Whereas the Statue of Liberty, a gift from France, is a monument to the friendship between the peoples of France and the United States of America;

Whereas the Statue of Liberty has been ravaged by time and the elements and is in a serious state of disrepair;

Whereas the President has appointed a twenty-member commission to raise funds for the restoration and preservation of the Statue of Liberty and Ellis Island and to plan centennial celebration events for 1986;

35,742

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
ROUTING SLIP

TO:

		ACTION	INFO	DATE	INITIAL
1	DCI		X		
2	DDCI		X		
3	EXDIR		X		
4	D/ICS		X		
5	DDI				
6	DDA				
7	DDO		X		
8	DDS&T				
9	Chm/NIC				
10	GC				
11	IG				
12	Compt		X		
13	D/EEO				
14	D/Pers				
15	D/OLL	X			
16	C/PAO				
17	SA/IA		X		
18	AO/DCI				
19	C/IPD/OIS				
20	C/LA/DO		X		
21	NIO/LA		X		
22					
SUSPENSE		Date			

Remarks



D/ Executive Secretary
7 March 84

Date

3637 (10-81)

STAT

Page Denied

Next 2 Page(s) In Document Denied